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Abstract
We study stock market reactions to the Brexit referendum on 23 June 2016
in order to assess investors’ expectations about the effects of leaving the
European Union on the UK economy. Our results suggest that initial stock
price movements were driven by fears of a cyclical downturn and by the
sterling depreciation following the referendum.We also find tentative evidence
that market reactions to two subsequent speeches by Theresa May (her
Conservative party conference and Lancaster House speeches) were more
closely correlated with potential changes to tariffs and non-tariff barriers on
UK–EU trade, indicating that investors may have updated their expectations in
light of the possibility of a ‘hard Brexit’. We do not find a correlation between
the share of EU immigrants in different industries and stock market returns.
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Policy points
 Stock market reactions to the Brexit referendum were mainly driven by
exchange rate movements and investors’ expectations of an economic
slowdown.
 Poor stock market performance of companies more exposed to the UK
market is highly persistent.
 There is weaker evidence that investors also expect higher future tariff
barriers with the EU.
 Reliance on EU immigrants does not determine sectoral stock market
performance in response to the referendum.
I. Introduction
On 23 June 2016, the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union (EU).
This decision is likely to be the most important change in UK economic policy
for a generation. Most studies conducted prior to the referendum concluded
that the long-run effect of a UK exit from the EU (‘Brexit’) would be a
reduction in British living standards.1 Because Brexit will not take place before
March 2019, it is too early to evaluate the actual long-run impact on the UK
economy. However, an increasing number of studies have documented that the
referendum has already had negative short-term consequences such as lower
GDP growth and higher inflation.2
In this paper, we add to the emerging literature on the short-run effects
of Brexit by studying stock market reactions to the referendum result
and subsequent policy announcements that clarified the likely form Brexit
would take – the speeches by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, at the
Conservative party conference in October 2016 and at Lancaster House in
January 2017.
Besides providing direct evidence on share prices and the associated
changes in stock market capitalisation and wealth, we hope that stock price
reactions will also be useful to gauge the future economic impact of Brexit.
Share prices are, in essence, aggregates of all information available to market
participants at any given point in time. They reflect expectations about the
future profitability of individual companies and sectors. Expected future
changes in economic conditions such as changes in trade barriers post-Brexit
will thus lead to immediate stock price reactions. Of course,market participants
may be wrong, and share price movements might not correctly capture the
effects of such changes. But given the information aggregation function of
stock markets, share price reactions capture the ‘consensus view’ of a large
1See, for example, HM Treasury (2016), OECD (2016), National Institute of Economic and Social
Research (2016) and Dhingra et al. (2017).
2See Born et al. (2017) and Breinlich et al. (2017).
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number of well-informed economic actors such as banks, insurance companies
and investment funds. They are thus a useful alternative to estimates based
on the work of individual experts, which form the basis of existing forecasts.
Indeed, this is the motivation behind a large body of stock market event studies
that use share price reactions to specific policy or regulatory events to infer
likely future effects.3
For each of our three events, we estimate abnormal returns for up to 350
UK-listed firms and regress these returns on indicators capturing exposure to
the potential effects of a future exit from the EU. Besides standard variables
such as firm size and profitability, we use firms’ export and import status, their
engagement in EU and UK markets, and whether they report in currencies
other than sterling. We also look at sector-level variables such as likely future
EU tariff and non-tariff barriers, business-cycle sensitivity and the share of EU
immigrants in the workforce of an industry.
We find that stock price changes on 24 June 2016, the first trading day after
the referendum, are best explained by variables capturing firms’ dependence
on the UK market, business-cycle sensitivity, and firms’ export status and
reporting currency. We interpret these results as evidence that initial market
reactions were driven by fears of an economic slowdown in the UK and by
the consequences of the steep depreciation of sterling that followed the Leave
vote. By contrast, prospective trade barriers do not have a significant impact,
suggesting that market participants either did not have sufficient knowledge
about such barriers or considered their imposition unlikely or unimportant.
This pattern is partially reversed when we look at reactions to Theresa
May’s speeches at the Conservative party conference on 5 October 2016 and
at Lancaster House on 17 January 2017. In our baseline specification, the
only variable that has a consistently significant impact on 5 October 2016 is
tariffs. In particular, firms in sectors with higher current EU import tariffs saw
lower abnormal returns. We believe this is consistent with the idea that May’s
speech, as well as other policy announcements during the Conservative party
conference, was the first official confirmation that the UK would be aiming
for an exit from both the EU Customs Union and the Single Market (a so-
called ‘hard Brexit’). The Lancaster House speech confirmed these intentions
and provided additional detail, as well as clarifying that the UK was prepared
to fall back on World Trade Organisation (WTO) trading terms in the event
of a breakdown of negotiations with the EU. Results are less clear-cut for
this event, but we also find negative coefficients on both tariff and non-tariff
barriers in our abnormal returns regressions. Compared with our results for the
day after the referendum, however, these additional findings appear somewhat
less robust and are sensitive to the length of the event window chosen. By
3See Binder (1998) for a survey.
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contrast, our proxies for recessionary expectations and sterling’s depreciation
retain explanatory power over longer event windows beyond 24 June 2016.
Our work contributes to a growing literature on the observed effects of the
Brexit vote on the UK economy. It is most closely related to three papers
that also study stock market reactions to the referendum and subsequent
events. Schiereck, Kiesel and Kolaric (2016) focus more narrowly on the
financial sector and show that stock prices of banks dropped sharply after
the referendum, particularly for EU banks. Ramiah, Pham and Moosa (2016)
look at a much wider range of sectors and discuss whether the observed
price reactions are in line with prior expectations. They do not regress
abnormal returns on explanatory variables, however, and thus cannot formally
test hypotheses about differential sector-level impacts advanced in the pre-
referendum literature. Similar to our paper, Davies and Studnicka (2018)
correlate abnormal returns with a number of explanatory variables, focusing
on the role of global value chains. We study a wider range of determinants,
however, and link our choice of explanatory variables more closely to forecasts
made before the referendum. This makes our results more relevant for a
comparison of expert forecasts with the expectations of market participants.
For example, we show that investors shared concerns regarding the potential
for an economic downturn stressed by pre-referendum forecasts as well as (to
a lesser extent) the importance of future trade barriers.
The present paper is also related to a small number of studies that look
at stock price reactions to trade policy events. Hartigan, Perry and Kamma
(1986), Hartigan, Kamma and Perry (1989), Hughes, Lenway and Rayburn
(1997), Bloningen, Tomlin and Wilson (2004) and Crowley and Song (2014)
look at stock price reactions to sector-specific anti-dumping duties. Grossman
and Levinsohn (1989) use stock price reactions to test the specific factors
model of international trade. Moser and Rose (2014) estimate the impact of
regional trade agreements on aggregate stock market indices, and Brander
(1991), Thompson (1993) and Breinlich (2014) follow stock price movements
surrounding the ratification process of the US–Canada Free Trade Agreement
of 1989. Our paper differs from these studies in that we look at stock market
reactions to an arguably much more significant policy change that is expected
to have strong effects beyond its direct implications for trade policy. In contrast
to the literature on free trade agreements, Brexit also presents an interesting
policy experiment in that it is expected to increase, rather than lower, future
trade barriers.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II outlines the
mechanisms throughwhichBrexitmay affect stock prices. Section III discusses
the stock market event study methodology we use. Section IV describes the
specific events as well as our explanatory variables and data sources in more
detail. Section V presents results for our abnormal returns regressions and
carries out a number of robustness checks. Section VI concludes.
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II. Economic mechanisms
The stock market response to the Brexit referendum ‘shock’ is expected to be
greater for firms that are more exposed to the shock and its consequences. The
shock has several different dimensions. First, the referendum result led to an
immediate depreciation of sterling. On 24 June 2016, the pound depreciated
by 8.1 per cent against the US dollar and 5.8 per cent against the euro. Second,
leaving the EU could lead to major changes in future trade and migration
policy. Third, the Leave vote increased uncertainty about UK economic policy
and may have caused investors to downgrade their expectations for future UK
growth in both the short run and over longer horizons.
The impact of the depreciation of sterling depends on firms’ participation in
international markets. Multinational firms that earn revenue in currencies other
than sterling will experience a direct increase in their sterling-denominated
earnings following the depreciation. This is likely to raise their market value,
since we study stock prices quoted in sterling. The depreciation may also boost
exporters’ profits in foreign markets through increased competitiveness and
higher markups, while negatively affecting importers by increasing the cost of
foreign goods.
Once theUK leaves the EU, itmay no longer be amember of the EU’s Single
Market or Customs Union. Instead, it might sign a free trade agreement with
the EU or it could trade with the EU under WTO rules. Trading onWTO terms
would lead to higher tariffs between the UK and the EU. Brexit is also likely
to increase border non-tariff barriers such as customs procedures and rules
of origin requirements. These barriers would be particularly costly for firms
with complex international supply chains. To the extent that there is regulatory
divergence between the UK and the EU after Brexit, exporters will also face
additional costs of complying with EU product standards. Overall, exposure
to future changes in UK–EU trade barriers is higher for firms that participate
in international trade through either exporting or importing, for multinational
firms with affiliates in EU countries and for firms in sectors where the EU
currently has high tariff or non-tariff barriers on trade with WTO members.
Since high levels of EU immigration were arguably an important driver of
the Leave vote, it is possible that the UK will impose tighter restrictions on
EU immigration after Brexit. Consequently, firms employing a high share of
EU immigrants may be more affected by the Leave vote, as they could suffer
from a reduction in labour supply.
Before the referendum, a majority of forecasters predicted a slowdown in
economic growth or even a recession in the event of a Leave victory. Thus,
firms in sectors that are less ‘recession-proof’ may be expected to suffer more
in the aftermath of the referendum. Since the likelihood of a slowdown or a
recession depends on investors’ expectations about the form Brexit will take,
the impact of policy announcements such as Theresa May’s speeches at the
C© 2018 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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Conservative party conference and at Lancaster House could also depend on
firms’ business-cycle sensitivities.
Finally, exposure to Brexit may also be related to firm characteristics such
as performance and size. Larger and more profitable firms might be more
resilient and better able to withstand any negative effects of Brexit. However,
such firms are also likely to be more engaged in the international economy
through trade or foreign investment. Consequently, the overall correlation of
these characteristics with exposure to Brexit is ambiguous.
The next two sections describe how we test the importance of these
mechanisms in explaining stock price responses to the Brexit vote. We first
explain the methodology used for estimating abnormal stock returns and then
discuss the variables employed to capture the different channels outlined
above.
III. Methodology
We follow a two-step procedure to estimate the impact of a number of Brexit-
related variables on the abnormal returns of UK-listed firms. First, we estimate
a model of ‘normal’ stock returns which adjusts for differences in risk and
other characteristics of stocks. A standard approach in the literature is to
use the so-called market model which relates the return, rit , on stock i at
time t to a stock-specific constant, αi , and the return on the market portfolio,
Rmt :4
rit = αi + βi Rmt + eit , t ∈ T1,(1)
where eit is the mean-zero random component of the return-generating process
and T1 is the so-called pre-event window of stock price data on which equation
1 is estimated. This method controls for differences in average returns across
stocks (αi ), a stock’s (non-diversifiable) risk as measured by βi andmovements
in the market portfolio. On event dates, stock returns also have an ‘abnormal’
component, τi t , which in the present context could be caused by the arrival of
unexpected news about Brexit and its effects on the UK economy. Thus, on
event dates, stock returns are given by
rit = αi + βi Rmt + τi t + eit , t ∈ T2,(2)
where T2 denotes the event window (for example, 24 June 2016 for our
referendum event). Having obtained estimates of αi and βi using stock price
data from the pre-event window only, we compute abnormal returns estimates,
τˆ i t , as a prediction error for the event window:
4Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997; Binder, 1998.
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τˆ i t = rit − rˆ i t(3)
= rit − αˆi − βˆ i Rmt , t ∈ T2,
where the predicted values, rˆ i t = αˆi + βˆ i Rmt , have been constructed using the
pre-event window estimates of αi and βi and the return on the market portfolio
on the event day.
The second step is to model abnormal returns as a function of variables that
explain variation in abnormal returns across firms and sectors:
τi t = κ + Xiγ + Z jδ + μi t , t ∈ T2,(4)
where τi t denotes the true abnormal return of firm i on event date t , κ is the
regression constant, Xi is an N × k1 vector of k1 firm-level regressors and Z j is
an N × k2 vector of k2 sector-level regressors where j denotes firm i’s industry
(N denotes the number of stocks included in the regression). We are interested
in the signs and magnitudes of two coefficient vectors, γ and δ, which describe
the correlation between our regressors and firm-level abnormal returns.5
An important issue for inference in event studies is the correct computation
of standard errors for the coefficient estimates of interest (γ and δ). To get
a clearer understanding of the issues at stake, note from equations 2 and 3
that the relationship between the true abnormal return, τi t , and the estimated
abnormal return, τˆ i t , is given by
τˆ i t = τi t + (αi − αˆi ) + (βi − βˆ i )Rmt + eit(5)
= τi t + ηi t , t ∈ T2,
where ηi t = (αi − αˆi ) + (βi − βˆ i )Rmt + eit . Furthermore, recall that we have
assumed that abnormal returns are a function of observables and a mean-zero
random component, μi t , as given by equation 4. Combining this expression
with equation 5 allows us to state our basic estimating equation as follows:
τˆ i t = τi t + ηi t(6)
= κ + Xiγ + Z jδ + μi t + ηi t
= κ + Xiγ + Z jδ + εi t , t ∈ T2,
5In principle, one could also directly use overall returns, rit , as the dependent variable in the second-stage
regression. We follow the standard practice in the event-study literature of using abnormal returns because
we want to examine the part of a stock’s return that is driven by the event in question, rather than other
return patterns specific to the stock or its correlation with the market portfolio. If such stock-specific return
patterns are correlated with our second-stage regressors, then using overall returns would bias our coefficient
estimates. In practice, overall and abnormal returns are highly correlated (in excess of 95 per cent on all
three event dates) and, in our robustness checks below, we show that none of our qualitative findings is
changed when using overall returns as the dependent variable.
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where εi t = μi t + ηi t . This expression shows that heteroskedasticity and cross-
sectional dependence of the residuals in regressions using estimated abnormal
returns as the dependent variable can arise from a number of sources.
First, there could be heteroskedasticity and/or cross-sectional dependence in
the random component of the abnormal returns themselves (μi t ). Second,
heteroskedasticity and/or cross-sectional dependence in the randomcomponent
of the return-generating process (eit ) could be present. Finally, the forecasting
error, (αi − αˆi ) + (βi − βˆ i )Rmt , might introduce both heteroskedasticity and
dependence; this source of error will become smaller as the length of the event
period increases, however.
Karafiath (1994) and Harrington and Shrider (2007) carry out Monte Carlo
simulations under different assumptions about the error terms eit and μi t
and find that simple ordinary least squares (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors performs well compared with other methods such
as feasible generalised least squares (GLS). To account for possible cross-
sectional dependence in εi t , we will also cluster standard errors by industry
throughout this paper.6
IV. Events and data sources
This section provides further information about the three events we will study,
the choice of explanatory variables for our abnormal returns regressions and
our data sources.
1. Description of events
We analyse stock market reactions to three events. The first is the referendum
on EU membership itself. While the referendum took place on 23 June 2016,
the outcome was not known until the early hours of the next day and we use 24
June 2016 (a Friday) as our first event date. The referendum result took market
participants by surprise. Opinion polls had predicted a close vote but betting
markets implied a probability of around 85 per cent that the UK would choose
to remain in the EU,7 reflecting the conventional wisdom that undecided voters
would opt for the status quo. Once it became clear that the UK had voted to
leave, the pound depreciated sharply against all major currencies and share
prices dropped when markets reopened on 24 June.8
6See Cameron and Miller (2015) for further details as well as the relevant formula. In our data, firms are
classified by our main data provider Bureau van Dijk into one of 150 NACE four-digit industries. However,
the number of industries actually included varies across regression samples and lies between 60 and 140.
7Economist, 2016.
8The FTSE All-Share index declined by 3.8 per cent on 24 June 2016. In our robustness checks, we will
look at longer event windows to capture potential anticipation effects or delayed effects of the referendum.
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Our second and third events centre on two speeches by Theresa May
outlining the likely form Brexit would take. While the referendum determined
that the UK would leave the EU, it remained unclear which of the many
possible post-Brexit arrangements would be chosen. For example, would the
UK continue to participate in the SingleMarket like Norway or form a customs
union with the EU similar to Turkey? Our second and third events revealed
information about the likely nature of future EU–UK relations, which is why
they represent useful additions to the analysis of post-referendum stock market
reactions. Theresa May’s speech at the Conservative party conference on 5
October 2016 outlined her vision for a post-Brexit UK.Most observers deemed
this vision incompatible with continued membership of the Single Market and
possibly the CustomsUnion. For example,May promised restrictions on future
EU immigration and an end to the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction in
theUK, both ofwhich are incompatiblewith integral parts of the SingleMarket.
Theresa May’s Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017 provided the first
detailed outline of the main objectives for the upcoming exit negotiations
with the EU and stated explicitly that the UK would leave the Single Market
and the Customs Union. It also clarified that the UK was prepared to fall
back on WTO trading terms in the event of a breakdown of negotiations with
the EU.
While both speeches represented a shift towards a ‘hard Brexit’, it is less
clear to what extent they led to significant changes in market participants’
expectations. In both cases, at least some of the information contained in the
speeches had been made available to the public beforehand. Nevertheless, at
least the Conservative party conference speech seems to have caught investors
unprepared9 and it led to a further 4.3 per cent depreciation of sterling against
the US dollar in the week following 5 October. By contrast, there seems to
have been a more concerted effort to prepare markets for the Lancaster House
speech as information about some of its key points had been released a couple
of days earlier. Sterling in fact rose by about 1.4 per cent during the speech,
presumably since investors valued greater certainty about the government’s
plans for Brexit.10 In order to capture potential anticipation effects, we will
use longer event windows for both the Conservative party conference and
Lancaster House speeches as part of our robustness checks.
2. Variables, data sources and descriptive statistics
For the computation of abnormal returns, we require information on stock
prices and market portfolio returns. Stock price information is taken from
Datastream and information about market portfolio returns is obtained from
9Financial Times, 2016.
10Financial Times, 2017.
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the websites of the London Stock Exchange and the website investing.com.
All returns in the paper are measured as percentage changes, implying that
abnormal returns are measured in percentage changes as well. We use the
FTSE All-Share index as our market portfolio proxy in most specifications.
However, we will also check the sensitivity of our results to using other proxies
such as the MSCI Europe as well as to controlling for multiple market indices
representing Asia, Europe and the US.
Regarding our regressors, we consider various sets of firm- and sector-
specific variables (Xi and Z j in equation 6) as outlined below. These regressors
are related to the economic mechanisms discussed in Section II.
First, we use a firm’s return on assets (ROA) and the value of its annual
sales (in logs) as measures of profitability and size, respectively. We obtain
data for both variables for the year before the referendum from Bureau van
Dijk’s Orbis database. The expected signs of these two regressors are a priori
unclear. As explained in Section II, on the one hand more profitable and larger
firms might be better able to withstand negative shocks. But on the other hand
they might be more vulnerable as they tend to be more exposed internationally.
Second, we follow Davies and Studnicka (2018) in using information from
Orbis on the share of a firm’s subsidiaries in the UK and the rest of the EU,
as well as the total count of subsidiaries.11 Davies and Studnicka interpret the
share variables as measuring the exposure of a firm’s global value chain (GVC)
to future trade barriers brought about by Brexit. The count of subsidiaries is
used as a proxy for the complexity of a firm’s GVC, with more complex GVCs
making a firm more vulnerable to the effects of leaving the EU. An alternative
interpretation of the share ofUKaffiliates, however, is as ameasure of exposure
to the domestic UK market. In the light of Davies and Studnicka’s results, we
expect all three variables to be negatively correlated with abnormal returns.
Third, we use information on a firm’s export and import status from Dun
& Bradstreet to construct three dummy variables for whether a firm is an
exporter, an importer or an exporter-importer.12 While these indicators do not
convey any information about the intensity with which firms trade, they are
the best available proxies for firms’ involvement in international trade. Given
the steep depreciation of sterling on 24 June 2016, we would expect exporters
to benefit from gaining competitiveness in foreign markets and importers to be
negatively affected by the higher cost of foreign goods. Exchange rate effects
were smaller and less immediate for the other two events, with the Lancaster
House speech actually leading to a slight appreciation of the pound. Hence,
11Throughout this paper, we are using the terms ‘affiliate’ and ‘subsidiary’ interchangeably.
12Dun & Bradstreet provide information on whether the company is an exporter (‘Yes or No’) or
importer (‘Yes or No’) and we create a dummy variable for export and import status of the company using
this information. If a company is reported both as an exporter and as an importer, we classify that company as
an exporter-importer. Dun & Bradstreet’s sources include annual reports, Company House reports, industry
reports and a network of 5,000 employees who check the accuracy of the data.
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the expected sign and significance patterns of the trade status dummies are less
clear for these events.
Fourth, our final firm-level indicator is a dummy variable for whether a firm
reports earnings in a currency other than sterling, again obtained from Orbis.
This variable serves as a proxy for whether a firm earns a substantial amount
of its profits in foreign currencies. If the pound depreciates, earnings measured
in pounds will increase, which will tend to push up the firm’s FTSE All-Share
stock price (which is quoted in pounds).13
We also include four sector-level regressors. First, we compute the share of
EU immigrants in the workforce of an industry, using data from the UKLabour
Force Survey published by the Office for National Statistics.14 As explained
in Section II, given that high levels of EU immigration were arguably a key
driver of the Leave vote, it is likely that the UK will see tighter restrictions
on EU immigration after Brexit. Hence, we may expect sectors with a higher
share of EU immigrants to see stronger negative abnormal returns. This should
be true for the reaction to the referendum result itself as well as for the two
speeches which explicitly mentioned future restrictions on EU immigration.
Second, we include a dummy variable for industries that tend to outperform
the market in recessions. We use the classification by Emsbo-Mattingly
et al. (2017), who classify consumer staples, healthcare, telecommunication
and utilities as ‘recession outperformers’.15 Since a majority of forecasters
predicted a growth slowdown or even a recession in the event of a Leave
victory, we expect ‘recession-proof’ stocks to do better on 24 June 2016.16 By
October 2016, however, it had become clear that the referendum result had not
led to an immediate economic slowdown. For example, the UK was still the
fastest-growing economy in the G7 at the end of 2016.17 Growth eventually
slowed during 2017,18 but this was not yet evident at the time of the Lancaster
House speech. Thus, we do not expect a significant correlation between the
recession-proof dummy and abnormal returns for our last two events.
Finally, we include two measures of firms’ exposure to future trade barriers
between the UK and the EU. For goods-producing industries, we use the
13We do not directly observe the geographic split of firm-level profits in our data. However, for a
subsample of firms, we have information on the distribution of sales based on subsidiary data. This
information shows that firms reporting in a foreign currency do indeed earn a smaller share of revenues in
pounds than firms reporting in GBP, and that this share is also small in absolute terms (on average, only
25 per cent of revenues come from inside the UK for firms reporting in a foreign currency).
14As is standard in the migration literature that uses this data set, we focus on the country of birth of
workers rather than their citizenship to define the share of EU immigrants.
15See exhibits 6 and 7 in Emsbo-Mattingly et al. (2017).
16In the month immediately after the referendum, there was indeed a sharp deterioration of indicators of
business confidence. For example, IHS Markit’s Purchasing Manager Index (PMI) dropped from 52 in June
to 47 in July 2016, a decrease of a magnitude last seen at the onset of the financial crisis in 2008.
17OECD, 2018.
18Born et al., 2017.
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EU’s most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs, which are charged on imports from
countries that do not have a preferential trade agreement with the EU.19 While
the Lancaster House speech stressed that the UK would be seeking EU market
access through a comprehensive free trade agreement, it also did not rule out
the UK leaving the EU without an exit deal. In that case, the UK would have
to fall back on trade governed by WTO rules. This would imply facing EU
MFN tariffs as well as, in all likelihood, imposing such tariffs on imports from
the EU. For services trade, future trade restrictions are harder to predict and
would take the form of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). If the UK were to leave
the Single Market, as implied by May’s Conservative party conference speech
and explicitly stated in her Lancaster House speech, it would lose preferential
access to EU services markets. Moreover, rules and regulations would likely
diverge from the EU over time, leading to further increases in NTBs. Hence, we
use the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) developed by the World
Bank to measure EU member countries’ policies as applicable to non-EU
providers.20
For both tariff and non-tariff barriers, we use two types of procedures tomap
trade barriers to firms. First, we calculate an average across all the industries
a firm is reported to be active in; second, we use a narrower measure that only
uses tariffs and NTBs for a firm’s core industry as reported in Orbis. We use
the wider measure in our baseline specification because it yields a significantly
higher number of observations. The narrower measure is included as part of
our robustness checks.
We start with data for all 636 companies in the FTSE All-Share at the time
of our data download (October 2017). We use the FTSE All-Share because it
provides a broad-based sample including firms with substantial international
activities as well as more domestically focused companies. We drop eight
companies that only report data for the financial year 2016 and with a closing
date after the referendum.21 We discard a further 26 firms that do not report
financial information at all in Orbis. For the estimation of the market model
parameters in equation 1, we require one year of pre-event stock price data,
which leads us to drop another 26 companies with short stock price time series.
A substantial share (32 per cent) of the remaining companies are investment
trusts.22 We exclude them from our baseline regressions because, in principle,
19We use ad-valorem-equivalent tariff rates for 2015, which is the most recent year available in theWorld
Bank’s WITS database (our data source).
20Data are for the year 2008, the only year available in the STRI. The STRI tries to measure the effect of
EU regulations that discriminate against foreign services or service providers.
21We only use financial information for the year before the referendum because the Leave vote itself may
have directly affected firms’ financial outcomes.
22Investment trusts are collective investments where investors’ money is pooled together from the sale
of a fixed number of shares which a trust issues when it launches. This money is then invested in a similar
fashion to open-ended investment funds and in a variety of assets, such as listed equities, government and
corporate bonds or real estate from any region in the world.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics
Variable No. of
observations
Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum
Log(assets)a 394 21.34 1.94 16.69 28.51
ROAa 393 0.05 0.10 –0.68 0.47
Non-GBP reporting currencya 394 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Share EU affiliatesa 394 0.18 0.20 0.00 1.00
Share UK affiliatesa 394 0.53 0.32 0.00 1.00
Log(number of affiliates)a 394 4.16 1.46 0.00 8.32
Log(sales)a 380 20.73 1.78 14.52 26.30
EU MFN (narrow)b 138 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.57
STRI (narrow)b 88 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.55
EU MFN (wide)b 143 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.57
STRI (wide)b 152 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.55
Share EU immigrantsb 394 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.46
Recession-proofb 394 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Exportera 366 0.29 0.46 0.00 1.00
Importera 366 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
Exporter-importera 366 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
aFirm-level variables.
bSector-level variables.
Note: Descriptive statistics are calculated over the baseline sample of firms, excluding investment trusts.
‘Log(assets)’ is the logarithm of the value of a firm’s assets. ‘ROA’ is a firm’s return on assets. ‘Non-
GBP reporting currency’ is a dummy variable for whether a firm reports earnings in a currency other than
sterling. ‘EU MFN’ is the current EU most-favoured nation tariff applied to third countries for goods-
producing industries, while ‘STRI’ is the Services Trade Restrictiveness Index developed by the World
Bank for services industries. ‘Recession-proof’ is a dummy variable for industries that tend to outperform
the market in recessions. ‘Exporter’, ‘Importer’ and ‘Exporter-importer’ are dummies for firms’ trade status.
Narrow and wide refer to the type of industry mapping methodology used.
they can invest anywhere in the world and it is unclear what effect Brexit
would have on them. There is also, of course, a problem of double-counting
for cases where investment trusts invest in other companies listed on the FTSE
All-Share index.23 Finally, missing values for some of the regressors used in
our analysis reduce the sample further, leaving us with around 350 stocks for
our baseline regression. In addition to this baseline sample, we also consider a
subsample of firms in goods-producing industries (for which we observe EU
MFN tariffs) and a subsample of service-producing firms for which we have
data on EU NTBs as measured by the STRI.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables just
discussed. Tables 2–4 show raw and abnormal returns on our three main event
23As part of our robustness checks, we show that extending the sample to investment trusts does not
qualitatively change our findings.
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TABLE 2
Best- and worst-performing stocks on 24 June 2016
Company name Industry (NACE
four-digit)
Return Abnormal
return
t-statistic
Top 10 performers
ACACIA MINING PLC Precious metals
production
17.0% 18.4% 5.69
RANDGOLD RESOURCES
LIMITED
Precious metals
production
14.2% 14.0% 5.64
FRESNILLO PLC Other mining and
quarrying nec
11.9% 14.1% 5.96
CENTAMIN PLC Mining of other
non-ferrous metal
ores
10.5% 11.3% 3.88
HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC Precious metals
production
6.0% 7.6% 1.71
POLYMETAL
INTERNATIONAL PLC
Mining of other
non-ferrous metal
ores
5.8% 7.4% 3.50
SIRIUS MINERALS PLC Mining of other
non-ferrous metal
ores
5.6% 8.1% 1.55
NMC HEALTH PLC Other human health
activities
5.0% 7.4% 3.39
COMPASS GROUP PLC Restaurants and
mobile food service
activities
3.9% 6.6% 6.69
HOGG ROBINSON GROUP PLC Travel agency
activities
3.8% 4.7% 2.29
Bottom 10 performers
INTERNATIONAL
CONSOLIDATED AIRLINES
GROUP S.A.
Passenger air transport –22.5% –18.3% –19.85
GRAFTON GROUP PUBLIC
LIMITED COMPANY
Other retail sale of new
goods in specialised
stores
–23.7% –20.5% –11.20
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS
P L C
Development of
building projects
–23.8% –20.2% –14.35
BOVIS HOMES GROUP PLC Construction of
residential and
non-residential
buildings
–24.3% –20.6% –13.34
(Continued)
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TABLE 2
Continued
Company name Industry (NACE
four-digit)
Return Abnormal
return
t-statistic
BELLWAY P L C Construction of
residential and
non-residential
buildings
–24.5% –21.5% –12.00
VIRGIN MONEY HOLDINGS
(UK) PLC
Activities of holding
companies
–24.9% –21.0% –12.57
CREST NICHOLSON
HOLDINGS PLC
Manufacture of
machinery for
mining, quarrying
and construction
–26.5% –22.9% –9.79
PERSIMMON PUBLIC
LIMITED COMPANY
Construction of
residential and
non-residential
buildings
–27.6% –24.2% –12.67
TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC Construction of
residential and
non-residential
buildings
–29.3% –25.6% –15.23
ALDERMORE GROUP PLC Activities of holding
companies
–32.0% –28.7% –15.71
Average across all companies in sample –6.4% –3.5%
Note: The table lists the best- and worst-performing stocks on 24 June 2016. It reports each company’s
main sector of activity, overall stock return, and the abnormal return and associated t-statistic (computed
following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)).
dates for the companies with the 10 highest and 10 lowest raw returns. On
24 June 2016, companies from the construction and related sectors accounted
for 6 out of the 10 worst-performing stocks, while precious metal producers
and other mining companies dominated among the 10 best performers. This
provides some first evidence that investors seem to have dumped business-
cycle-sensitive shares on 24 June 2016 in favour of ‘safe-haven’ stocks such
as gold producers (for example, Acacia Mining or Randgold Resources). By
contrast, no clear pattern is evident on the other two event dates. Finally, note
that both average returns and abnormal returns were strongly negative on the
day after the referendum but not on 5 October 2016 nor on 17 January 2017.
This is consistent with our prior that the two later events led to less significant
changes in market participants’ expectations.
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TABLE 3
Best- and worst-performing stocks on 5 October 2016
Company name Industry (NACE four-digit) Return Abnormal
return
t-statistic
Top 10 performers
TESCO PLC Retail sales, non-specialised
stores
9.8% 10.4% 5.64
ALDERMORE GROUP
PLC
Activities of holding
companies
6.9% 7.5% 2.91
RENOLD PUBLIC
LIMITED COMPANY
Manufacture of bearings,
gears, gearing and driving
elements
5.8% 6.2% 2.29
KENMARE RESOURCES
PUBLIC LIMITED
COMPANY
Other mining and quarrying
nec
5.1% 5.8% 0.80
CAMBIAN GROUP PLC Other human health activities 4.6% 5.2% 0.94
SPEEDY HIRE PLC Renting/leasing of other
machinery, equipment and
tangible goods nec
3.9% 4.4% 1.28
JOHN MENZIES PLC Non-specialised wholesale
trade
3.5% 3.7% 2.28
ELECTROCOMPONENTS
PLC
Wholesale of electronic and
telecommunications
equipment and parts
3.3% 3.7% 1.90
COATS GROUP PLC Manufacture of other
special-purpose machinery
nec
3.2% 3.3% 1.75
STV GROUP PLC Television programming and
broadcasting activities
3.2% 3.4% 1.50
Bottom 10 performers
CARCLO PLC Manufacture of other
outerwear
–3.7% –3.5% –1.20
RANDGOLD
RESOURCES LIMITED
Precious metals production –4.0% –4.1% –1.66
LSL PROPERTY
SERVICES PLC
Real estate agencies –4.0% –3.8% –1.99
UNITED UTILITIES
GROUP PLC
Water collection, treatment
and supply
–4.4% –4.0% –4.56
DEVRO PLC Manufacture of other food
products nec
–4.7% –4.4% –2.81
LOW & BONAR PUBLIC
LIMITED COMPANY
Manufacture of household and
sanitary goods and toilet
requisites
–5.2% –4.9% –2.60
POLYMETAL
INTERNATIONAL PLC
Mining of other non-ferrous
metal ores
–5.7% –5.7% –2.70
(Continued)
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TABLE 3
Continued
Company name Industry (NACE four-digit) Return Abnormal
return
t-statistic
HOCHSCHILD MINING
PLC
Precious metals production –6.1% –6.2% –1.39
PAYPOINT PLC Activities of collection
agencies and credit bureaus
–6.2% –6.0% –3.70
TOPPS TILES PLC Wholesale of wood,
construction materials and
sanitary equipment
–8.7% –8.6% –5.04
Average across all companies in sample –0.4% 0.0%
Note: The table lists the best- and worst-performing stocks on 5 October 2016. It reports each company’s
main sector of activity, overall stock return, and the abnormal return and associated t-statistic (computed
following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)).
TABLE 4
Best- and worst-performing stocks on 17 January 2017
Company name Industry (NACE four-digit) Return Abnormal
return
t-statistic
Top 10 performers
CAMBIAN GROUP PLC Other human health activities 7.1% 8.1% 1.47
GAMES WORKSHOP
GROUP PLC
Manufacture of games and toys 6.3% 6.4% 3.53
ROLLS-ROYCE
HOLDINGS PLC
Manufacture of air and
spacecraft and related
machinery
4.4% 6.1% 2.89
DECHRA
PHARMACEUTICALS
PLC
Manufacture of pharmaceutical
preparations
4.1% 4.5% 3.08
HARGREAVES
LANSDOWN PLC
Security and commodity
contracts brokerage
3.9% 5.5% 4.24
ZOTEFOAMS PLC Manufacture of other plastic
products
3.9% 4.2% 2.42
INTERNATIONAL
PERSONAL FINANCE
PLC
Activities auxiliary to financial
services, excluding insurance
and pension
3.7% 5.2% 1.87
PREMIER OIL PLC Extraction of crude petroleum 3.6% 6.9% 1.29
EASYJET PLC Passenger air transport 3.4% 4.3% 2.81
MORGAN ADVANCED
MATERIALS PLC
Manufacture of other chemical
products nec
3.1% 4.6% 2.63
(Continued)
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TABLE 4
Continued
Company name Industry (NACE four-digit) Return Abnormal
return
t-statistic
Bottom 10 performers
WOLSELEY PLC Wholesale of hardware,
plumbing and heating
equipment and supplies
–3.2% –1.9% –1.48
INTERTEK GROUP PLC Technical testing and analysis –3.2% –2.3% –1.65
PZ CUSSONS PLC Manufacture of soap and
detergents, cleaning and
polishing preparations
–3.5% –2.6% –1.68
CARNIVAL PLC Sea and coastal passenger water
transport
–3.5% –2.3% –1.62
JIMMY CHOO PLC Retail sale of footwear and
leather goods in specialised
stores
–3.6% –2.6% –1.05
VEDANTA RESOURCES
PLC
Casting of other non-ferrous
metals
–3.8% –1.5% –0.38
BRITISH AMERICAN
TOBACCO P.L.C.
Manufacture of tobacco products –3.8% –2.9% –3.78
FERREXPO PLC Mining of iron ores –4.0% –2.4% –0.40
GULF MARINE
SERVICES PLC
Building of ships and floating
structures
–6.0% –5.2% –1.83
HUNTSWORTH PLC Market research and public
opinion polling
–7.3% –6.9% –3.13
Average across all companies in sample –0.2% 0.7%
Note: The table lists the best- and worst-performing stocks on 17 January 2017. It reports each company’s
main sector of activity, overall stock return, and the abnormal return and associated t-statistic (computed
following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997)).
V. Results
1. Baseline results
Table 5 shows our baseline results. Columns 1–3 look at abnormal returns on
24 June 2016, the first trading day following the referendum, and columns 4–9
examine abnormal return patterns on our other two event dates.
In column 1, we exclude our two trade barrier measures, allowing us
to use the largest possible sample (352 stocks). As seen, most but not all
coefficient signs confirm our prior expectations. Firms reporting in currencies
other than sterling experienced additional positive abnormal returns of around
3.6 percentage points. By contrast, increasing the share of subsidiaries in
the UK or the EU by 10 percentage points reduces abnormal returns by
C© 2018 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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0.9 percentage points and 0.4 percentage points, respectively. Contrary to
the results reported in Davies and Studnicka (2018), however, the latter effect
is not statistically significant.24 Our recession-proof dummy is also positive
and significant as expected, indicating that stocks in industries that perform
better during downturns experienced abnormal returns that were 3.6 percentage
points higher. Finally, the trade status indicators broadly conform to our priors;
export status is associated with higher and import status with lower abnormal
returns, and exporter-importers saw abnormal returns of an additional 2.24
percentage points. With the exception of import status, all trade indicators are
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
The remaining regressors are all statistically insignificant. Contrary to
Davies and Studnicka (2018), we do not find a significant effect of the total
number of subsidiaries.25 Our proxies for size and profitability (ROA and log
sales) are also insignificant, as is the share of EU immigrants in an industry.26
Overall, abnormal return patterns on 24 June 2016 are mainly driven by the
exchange rate devaluation and the fear of a possible economic slowdown or
recession. The signs and significance patterns of the non-UK currency dummy
and the trade status indicators are consistent with the expected impact of
the sharp depreciation of the pound. The fact that stocks in ‘recession-proof’
industries did significantly better and that firms with more affiliates in the
UK, and hence more exposure to the domestic market, did worse points to the
additional role of recessionary expectations. Both sets of independent variables
together explain around 34 per cent of the total variation in abnormal returns
on 24 June 2016. Adding the remaining regressors from Table 5 only increases
this slightly to 37 per cent.27
What role did expectations of higher trade barriers play in explaining
abnormal return patterns? The results in columns 2 and 3, where we include
tariff barriers for goods-producing industries and non-tariff barriers for selected
service industries, respectively, suggest that such expectations did notmatter as
both trade barrier proxies are insignificant. We caution that sample sizes are, of
course, considerably smaller in both regressions, explaining why some of the
24The insignificance of the EU share variable seems to be driven by the inclusion of regressors not used
by Davies and Studnicka (2018). After dropping the recession-proof and trade status dummies, as well as
using log(assets) instead of log(sales) as in Davies and Studnicka (2018), the coefficient on the EU share
regressor becomes significant at the 1 per cent level.
25Again, this seems to be due to the inclusion of additional control variables in our regressions. When
we drop the recession-proof and trade status dummies, the coefficient on the number of affiliates decreases
to –0.0052 and becomes statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
26Looking across columns in Table 5, the impact of higher ROA is always negative but only statistically
significant on two occasions. The coefficients on log(sales) and the EU immigrant share are less stable and
sometimes switch signs.
27Using only the two recession proxies still yields an R2 of 26 per cent and only using the exchange
rate proxies yields an R2 of 20 per cent. By contrast, all the other regressors together only explain around
7 per cent of the variation in abnormal returns.
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other indicators also become statistically insignificant. Interestingly, the share
of affiliates in the EU becomes significantly negative in the goods-producing
subsample regression (column 2), possibly suggesting that dependence on EU
supply chains is more important for manufacturing firms. The only indicators
that are consistently statistically significant across all three samples (columns
1–3) are the indicators we associate with expectations of a future recession
(i.e. the recession-proof dummy and the share of affiliates in the UK).
Columns 4–6 and columns 7–9 in Table 5 examine abnormal return patterns
on our other two event dates. As seen, the number of significant variables and
the overall explanatory power of the regressors drop significantly, in line with
our prior that these events only led to relatively minor changes in investor
expectations. A number of interesting results emerge nevertheless.
First, the MFN tariff variable becomes significantly negative on 5 October
2016, consistent with Theresa May’s Conservative party conference speech
signalling the intent to pursue a hard Brexit.28 In terms of magnitudes, the
coefficient estimate suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in future MFN
tariffs is associatedwith 0.045 percentage points lower abnormal returns.Given
that the average MFN tariff in our sample is 4.5 per cent, our results suggest
that the expectation of higher tariffs was associated with negative abnormal
returns of around 0.2 percentage points in the average industry. However,
this average hides significant variation across sectors. For example, the MFN
tariff at the 90th percentile of the distribution of tariffs across sectors is 15 per
cent and the maximum tariff (for the dairies and cheese-making industry) is
57 per cent, corresponding to abnormal return changes of 0.7 and 2.6 percentage
points, respectively.29
Second, MFN tariffs are also associated with more negative abnormal
returns on 17 January 2017, the day of TheresaMay’s Lancaster House speech,
although the effect is smaller than in October and statistically insignificant. By
contrast, the STRI variable proxying for non-tariff barriers in the service sector
is now negative and statistically significant for the first time.
28Inclusion of the MFN tariff variable also raises the explanatory power of the regression substantially
from an R2 of 7.5 per cent to an R2 of 13 per cent. In terms of R2 increases, it is the best explanatory variable
for the goods-producing subsample on 5 October 2016.
29It is standard practice in the trade literature to break down overall tariff changes into import tariffs
(payable by EU exporters to the UK), export tariffs (payable by UK exporters to the EU) and intermediate
input tariffs (i.e. import tariffs leading to increases in the cost of domestic producers importing foreign
intermediate inputs). Unfortunately, this decomposition is not feasible here. First, the most likely scenario
is that the EU and the UK will impose the same MFN tariffs on each other in a WTO scenario. Second,
we tried computing intermediate input tariffs using the UK’s input–output matrix but, given the level of
aggregation available in UK input–output tables, the resulting tariff was highly correlated with the MFN
tariff (correlation coefficient of around 0.8). One case where the exclusion of intermediate input tariffs is
clearly problematic is the sugar producer Tate & Lyle, who mainly use cane sugar and would benefit from a
possible lowering of UK import tariffs after Brexit. Indeed, dropping Tate & Lyle from our sample decreases
the MFN tariff coefficient to –0.05.
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A final pattern that emerges on 17 January is that the two recession proxies
(the recession-proof dummy and the share of affiliates in the UK) now have
the opposite signs to the post-referendum day, although coefficient magnitudes
are much smaller in absolute terms. It is not entirely clear how to interpret this
result but it would be consistent with the generally positive market reactions
to the Lancaster House speech mentioned in Section IV.2.
To conclude, the abnormal return patterns on 24 June are best interpreted
as capturing the effects of the steep depreciation of sterling and fears of an
imminent growth slowdown or recession. By contrast, future trade barriers and
immigration shares across industries played no role in explaining abnormal
returns. There is, however, some tentative evidence that share price reactions
on 5 October and 17 January were at least in part due to expectations of higher
future tariff and non-tariff barriers.30
2. Robustness checks
Tables 6–12 present a number of robustness checks. We focus on what we
consider the most important checks here and report additional results in
Appendix B (available online).31
Table 6 uses two alternative measures for the importance of UK and EU
affiliates, focusing on the full sample of firms. Columns 1–3 use share data from
Orbis based on the sales rather than the count of affiliates in the UK and the EU.
Columns 4–6 use segment data from the annual accounts of parent companies,
which report the geographic breakdown of overall sales (also obtained from
Orbis). Both variables are likely to be better proxies for the importance of the
domestic market and the EU market for UK-listed firms than share measures
based on simple counts of affiliates. However, this comes at the cost of a
substantial decrease in sample size.32 The results are qualitatively similar to
those in Table 5 although the proxies for the sterling depreciation are less
significant.33
30Note that, throughout, we are assuming that no firm-specific information is revealed on event dates that
is systematically correlated with our regressors of interest. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed enough
data on firm announcements to explicitly control for such potentially confounding factors.
31These additional robustness checks are: (i) including investment trusts in our regression sample; (ii)
applying a narrower definition of our trade barrier measures by using only data for a firm’s core industry
rather than an average barrier across all industries a firm is active in; (iii) including dummy variables for
broad NACE one-digit industry groups (agriculture and mining, manufacturing, utilities and construction,
finance and insurance, and other services); (iv) using a different market portfolio proxy for the computation
of abnormal returns (the MSCI Europe instead of the FTSE All-Share); and (v) using a six-month instead
of a one-year estimation period for the computation of abnormal returns.
32See Appendix A (available online) for details on how we compute these two alternative measures.
33We do not report results for the goods-producing and services subsamples because the number of
observations drops to as few as 50. Coefficient estimates on the MFN tariff and STRI variables are almost
identical to those in Table 5, although significance levels drop. Depending on the specification, both remain
significant at the 10 per cent level, however.
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In Tables 7 and 8, we examine the sensitivity of our results to different
specifications of our first-stage market model estimation (equation 1). In
Table 7, we include three market indices in addition to the FTSEAll-Share: the
S&P 500, the MSCI Asia and the MSCI Europe. Ramiah, Martin and Moosa
(2013) argue that this is necessary to control for the effects of asynchronicity,
stock market integration and spillover effects in event studies. In Table 8,
we allow for the possibility that our events led to persistent changes in
systematic risk. Following Ramiah et al. (2013) and Breinlich (2014), we
do so by interacting the market model equation’s stock-specific intercepts and
correlations with the market portfolio with dummy variables taking the value
1 after each of the events.34 Both modifications yield results that are very
similar to our baseline estimates, consistent with the notion that for short event
windows such as ours, the exact model used for the computation of abnormal
returns is of lesser importance.35,36
In Table 9, we use overall instead of abnormal returns as the dependent
variable in our regressions (i.e. rit in the notation of Section III). As we
explained in Section III, abnormal returns are our preferred dependent variable
because they control for stock-specific return patterns that are unrelated to the
event in question and might be correlated with our second-stage regressors.
This said, returns on the market portfolio are likely to have been driven by
the events in question to some extent, especially for our referendum event, so
that we might not want to eliminate this part of overall returns. In practice,
however, abnormal and overall returns are highly correlated in our sample.
The correlation coefficient between the two returns is 97 per cent on 24 June
2016, 99 per cent on 5 October 2016 and 95 per cent on 17 January 2017.
Not surprisingly then, the results presented in Table 9 are very similar to our
baseline results.
Tables 10–12 explore the effect of varying the length of our event windows.
In Table 10, we add the trading day before and after the event in question
and use cumulative abnormal returns over these three-day windows as our
dependent variable. This does not significantly affect coefficient patterns for
the referendum event (now 23–27 June 2016 as no trading took place on 25
34That is, we now replace equation 1 with rit = αi + βi Rmt +
∑
v
dpost,v(αi + βi Rmt ) + eit , where v
denotes our three events and dpost,v = 1 for dates on or after event v. Note that in order to be able to estimate
this new equation, we need to extend our original estimation period to include and go beyond our event
dates. In practice, we use data up to 31 May 2017.
35See Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).
36Note that allowing for persistent changes in systematic risk by augmenting the market model equation
with additional interaction terms is not suitable for controlling for more short-term changes in risk premiums.
To see this, note that, in the extreme, one might want to allow for event-day-specific changes in market
model parameters, which would mean fitting observed returns perfectly with no abnormal returns left to
explain. Thus, we caution that our results might at least in part pick up short-term changes in firm-specific
risk perceptions in addition to changes in the future profitability of individual companies.
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and 26 June). Significance levels are reduced for the other two events although
the coefficient on the MFN tariff variable is around 50 per cent larger than
before for the Conservative party conference event.
Table 11 uses time windows that are more specific to the events in question.
As discussed, the Leave vote came as a clear surprise to market participants
so that using a longer pre-event window does not seem appropriate. Instead,
we extend our window to include an additional trading week after the event,
so the window now runs from 23 June to 1 July. By this time, both the FTSE
100 and the FTSE All-Share indices had regained their initial losses, so it is
of interest to see whether our coefficient pattern remains the same over this
longer event horizon.
For our two other events, it seems likely that at least some of the relevant
information reached market participants before the actual speeches, so we
extend our event window to include the entire trading week surrounding the
event. This is sufficient to include other speeches at the Conservative party
conference as well as interviews given to prepare market participants ahead of
the Lancaster House speech.37
For the referendum event, results for the longer event window are
qualitatively similar to before. Our proxies for recession expectations remain
highly statistically significant and coefficient estimates are larger in magnitude
than for our baseline results. The same is true for the dummy variable indicating
whether firms report in a currency other than pounds, although the effect for
the goods-producing subsample is not statistically significant. Coefficient signs
for the trade status indicators are similar to before but statistical significance
is again lower.
Turning to the other two event windows, results are less consistent
with previous estimates. The signs on the two trade barrier variables are
still negative for the Conservative party conference speech event but no
longer statistically significant; by contrast, the MFN tariff variable is positive
(although insignificant) for the Lancaster House speech.38 This is surprising
given that information about the likely form of Brexit had leaked in the days
prior to the two speeches and casts doubt on whether market participants
really based stock price valuations on likely future trade barriers. By contrast,
37Two events of particular importance in this context were a brief speech by Theresa May on Sunday
2 October 2016 and an interview of Philip Hammond, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, with the German
newspaperWelt am Sonntag on Sunday 15 January 2017. Both events provided information about the content
of the subsequent speeches. However, they were both more low-key than Theresa May’s main speeches on
5 October and 17 January, and the main negative reaction in currency markets only occurred after the 5
October speech. This is why we focus on the dates of the main speeches in our baseline regressions.
38The inclusion of Tate & Lyle again seems to strongly influence estimates for the MFN variable on 5
October 2016; as discussed previously, Tate & Lyle would stand to gain from potentially lower intermediate
input tariffs after Brexit (see footnote 29). Excluding Tate & Lyle from the regression does indeed nearly
double the coefficient on the tariff variable to –0.049, a magnitude similar to that in our baseline regressions.
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one of our recession proxies (the share of subsidiaries in the UK) is now
significantly negative across two out of three samples for our second event
(5 October).
These results indicate that the correlation between prospective trade barriers
and abnormal returns found earlier seems somewhat fragile and depends on
the exact specification of the relevant event windows. By contrast, the results
related to sterling’s depreciation and investors’ expectations of a slowdown
or recession are robust to short extensions of our event window. As a final
robustness check, we extend the event window for the referendum event yet
further, to 20 and 60 trading days after 24 June 2016, respectively. This allows
us to check how long-lasting the impact of the referendum on abnormal return
patterns was. We note that these results need to be interpreted with more
caution than those for our shorter event windows. This is because new stock-
specific information that is unrelated to the Brexit referendum will become
available in the weeks and months after the event, making the interpretation
of cumulative abnormal return patterns more difficult. That is, the longer the
horizon, the harder it is to argue that abnormal returns are caused only (or at
least mainly) by the event in question. In addition, specification choices for the
abnormal returns estimation equation (for example, whether or not additional
market indices are included) become much more important over longer time
horizons, creating additional sources of noise.
Looking at columns 1–3 of Table 12, we see that results are still broadly
similar for cumulative abnormal returns over the 20 trading days after
the referendum. The main difference from our baseline results is that the
coefficients on our proxies for exchange rate effects (currency dummy,
trade status indicators) are smaller and less significant than before. On the
other hand, the coefficients on our proxies for recessionary expectations
(recession-proof dummy, share of UK affiliates) have actually increased
in size and significance. Cumulative abnormal returns over the 60 trading
days after the referendum (columns 4–6) show somewhat weaker patterns
than before. The regression R2 is now only around 15 per cent, compared
with approximately 30 per cent for the 20-day horizon and 35 per cent
for our baseline regression. The proxies for exchange rate effects are now
insignificant although, interestingly, coefficient signs and magnitudes are
similar to before, suggesting that the lack of significance is mainly driven
by increased noise. The recession-proof dummy is now also slightly smaller
in magnitude and insignificant throughout, possibly reflecting the fact that by
September 2016, it had become clear that initial fears of an immediate recession
were unfounded. Nevertheless, the coefficient magnitudes and significance
levels of the UK affiliate share variable are still very similar to our baseline
results, indicating that investors continued to take a negative view of firms
with high exposure to the domestic UK market almost three months after the
referendum.
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VI. Conclusions
This paper studies stock market reactions to the result of the 2016 UK
referendum on EU membership and to two of the main subsequent policy
announcements that clarified the likely form Brexit would take, TheresaMay’s
Conservative party conference speech on 5 October 2016 and her Lancaster
House speech on 17 January 2017. Besides providing direct evidence on share
pricemovements, the purpose of this analysis is to use price reactions as a guide
to the likely future economic impact of Brexit and the channels through which
such effects might materialise. To this end, we correlated stock price reactions
with indicators capturing different potential effects of Brexit, including short-
run impacts linked to the depreciation of sterling and the possibility of a
slowdown in economic activity, as well as measures of potential future tariff
and non-tariff barriers.
Our results support the hypothesis that stockmarket participants expected an
economic downturn or even a recession in the days after the referendum. Share
price movements during this period were also affected by the depreciation of
sterling. By contrast, we find little evidence for the importance of variation in
EU immigrant shares across industries or future trade barriers in explaining
abnormal returns following the referendum result. When analysing market
reactions to Theresa May’s two speeches, our proxies have less explanatory
power, consistent with the idea that much of the content of the speeches was
already known to investors. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that abnormal
return patterns were at least partially explained by expectations about future
tariff and non-tariff barriers on the days of the two speeches. This result is less
robust, however, and depends on the length of the event window chosen.
While our analysis provides new insight into investors’ expectations about
the consequences of Brexit, real economic effects will take time to materialise
and market participants may be wrong. Fears that the Leave vote would trigger
an immediate recession were unfounded, but the UK’s economic growth has
slowed relative to other major economies since 2016.39 It is too soon to know
how Brexit will affect firms that engage in cross-border trade or investment
between the UK and the EU. Crucially, the impact will depend on the nature of
UK–EU relations after Brexit, which, at the time of writing, remain undecided.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
39Born et al., 2017.
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